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«'Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances, with any portion of 
the foreign world. » 
George Washington, on leaving office, 1796. 
"Personally J feel happier now that we have no allies to be polite to and to 
pamper." 
King George VI, on hearing Britain stood 
alone against H itler, June 1940. 
U nlike George Washington and George VI, those who contem plated mili-tary action in Afghanistan in 200 I were eager to be part of a broad, capable 
and committed coali tion. As well as the obvious practical benefits in terms of addi-
tional military assets and the crucial staging and basing support, they wanted the 
Taliban and al Qaeda to know that the resolve to defeat them stretched across all 
continents and many governments. The attacks of September 11, 2001 were so ex-
traordinary in both scale and ferocity that no nation was likely to hesi tate in identi-
fying a clear legal basis to come to the assistance of the United States. 
In fact the earliest days of the coalition were characterized by general consen-
sus among its members: consensus on the horror of the attacks of 9/ 11 , consensus 
on the fact that they represented an armed attack for the purposes of Article 5 1, I 
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consensus that for those in NATO the Article 5 right to act in defense of the 
United States was triggered2 and consensus that there was sufficient nexus be-
tween al Qaeda and the Taliban for an invasion of Afghanistan to be a proper re-
sponse. Indeed, it is difficult to find much divergence of approach at this point 
among those who came to the support of the United States. United Nations Secu-
rity Council Resolution 13733 made it quite clear that the inherent right of indi-
vidual and collective self-defense had been triggered. 
The United Kingdom's position, set out in a letter to the United Nations Secu-
rity Council on October 7, 200I,~ seems to have reflected the view of most of those 
who took part in the early stages of the Afghan campaign. It identified that the at-
tack triggered the United States' inherent right of self-defense and the right of allies 
to act in collective self-defense. That said, the United Kingdom government did 
not rely solely on the attacks of September 11, 2001 as a basis for acting in collective 
self-defense of the United States. It referred also to the need to avert attacks from 
the same source in the future, and the contin uing threat posed by al Qaeda. There 
was also reference to the August 7, 1998 attacks on the US embassies in Tanzania 
and Kenya and the October 12,2000 attack on the USS Cole at anchor in Aden, for 
all of which al Qaeda had claimed responsibility. The United Kingdom wanted to 
make it clear it was not retaliation it contemplated, but self-defense in response to a 
campaign of international terrorist violence. 
The German government, who had until 1994 been constrained from deploying 
troops outside Germany and retained a reputation fo r being cautious in its inter-
pretation of the international law right to act in self-defense, had no doubt of the 
lawfulness of US actions. On September 19,2001, Chancellor Schroderstated that 
[tlhe [North Atlantic] Council-like the Security Council-now also regards a 
terrorist attack as an attack on a Party to the Treaty. The attack on the United States 
thus constitutes an attack on all NATO partners. What rights do these decisions create 
for the United States? Based on the decision of the Security Council, the United States 
can take measures against the perpetrators, organizers, instigators and sponsors of the 
attacks. These measures are authorized by international law. And, under the terms of 
the resolution, which further develops international law, they can and may take equally 
resolute action against States which support and harbour the perpetrators.5 
Similarly, there is no evidence that the connection between the perpetrators of 
the attacks and the government of Afghanistan troubled the coalition members for 
very long. Most, if not all, were satisfied that the Taliban were the de facto govern-
ment of Afghanistan even if they were not recognized as the legitimate government 
by the United Nations. The generally held view was that the Taliban had failed over 
a period of two years to comply with Security Council resolutions6 following the 
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bombings of the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and could be regarded both as 
inextricably linked with and sheltering al Qaeda. Certainly the Taliban did not seek 
assistance with removing al Qaeda from their territory, nor did they condemn it 
publicly. They were given a "last chance" by the United States to surrender Osama 
Bin Laden, which they refused. 
Early coalition contributions to the invasion of Afghanistan also reflected the 
generally held view that this was an international armed conflict. The deployment 
of forces and the details of their rules of engagement (ROE) were based on the 
premise that this was a conflict between the "coalition of the willing" on the one 
hand and Taliban forces, al Qaeda and the Afghan army on the other. That left no 
doubt that the four 1949 Geneva Conventions1 applied and, for those who were 
signatories, Additional Protocol 1.8 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) began October 7, 200 1, when President 
Bush made the following statement: 
On my orders. the United States military has begun strikes against AI Qaeda terrorist 
training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. These 
carefully targeted actions are designed to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist 
base of operations, and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime. We are 
joined in this operation by our staunch friend, Great Britain. Other dose friends, 
including Canada, Australia, Germany and France, have pledged forces as the 
operation unfolds. More than 40 countries in the Middle East, Africa, Europe and 
across Asia have granted air transit or landing rights. Many more have shared 
intelligence. We are supported by the collective will ofthe world.9 
President Bush's words set the scene for a coalition of broad international base 
and substantial military depth: the Afghan government had few friends in the in-
ternational community. The coalition enjoyed rapid success and by November 
200 I the Taliban had evacuated Kabul, melting back into the Pushtun populace in 
southern Afghanistan and the Pakistani tribal areas. With this short-term military 
objective complete, attention (particularly in Europe) turned to the form and pur-
pose of an enduring presence in Afghanistan. It is at this point that the different 
understandings of the legal basis for presence, use of force, detention and other 
military activity begin to impact more noticeably on the conduct of operations. 
Operation Enduring Freedom and International Security Assistance Force: 
Different Missions and Different Legal Frameworks 
The United States continued to consider its activities in Afghanistan as one front in 
its Global War on Terror. Although it is not suggested that this term is to be taken 
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literally as an indication that the law of armed conflict applied to all responses to 
terrorism, it was clear the United States saw the pursuit of a1 Qaeda, both within 
and outside Afghanistan, as primarily a milita'1' mission. As such, OEF was pre-
sented to other militaries as part ofa regional international armed conflict. A num-
ber of the nations that had supported the invasion continued to provide forces to 
OEF, including the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia, albeit they may not 
have (and certainly the United Kingdom did not) endorsed the concept of a Global 
War on Terror. The OEF mission not only covered all parts of Afghanistan, but 
stretched across the entire region, although most coalition partners limited their 
milita'1' activity to the territo'1'of Afghanistan. President Bush had set out the fol-
lowing aims of the mission on October 7,2001, and they remained the basis of mis-
sion directives and rules of engagement: 
By destroying camps and disrupting communications, we will make it more difficult 
for the terror network to train new recruits and coordinate their evil plans. Initially, the 
terrorists may burrow deeper into caves and other entrenched hiding places. Our 
military action is also designed to clear the way for sustained, comprehensive and 
relentless operations to drive them out and bring them to justice. 10 
OEF activity included substantial air operations by forces based both in Af-
ghanistan and elsewhere, along with operations on the ground. Certainly they ex-
tended across the whole of Afghanistan and were often similar in intensity to those 
that formed part of the invasion. The emb'1'onic government in Kabul, which 
clearly supported efforts to eliminate remaining al Qaeda and Taliban forces, not 
least to secure its own position, was not in a position to supervise or approve the 
conduct of the milita'1' mission. It consented to OEF's continuation in principle, 
but had no veto or control of particular operations. The business of establishing a 
national democratic government for the first time in the nation's hist0'1' did not 
allow for detailed involvement in OEF operational decisions. The extent to which 
it would have been consulted had it sought to be is not clear. The absence of direct 
involvement by the Afghan government in 2001-2 tends to support the premise 
that OEF remained the expression of an international armed conflict between the 
OEF fo rces and the remaining Taliban and al Qaeda forces, albeit the Taliban and 
al Qaeda were never capable of being high contracting parties for the purposes of 
the Geneva Conventions. II 
In parallel and following the Bonn conference in December 2001, the Interna-
tional Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established by Security Council Resolu-
tion 1386.12 On December 20, 2001, a UK general, Lieutenant General John McColl, 
took command of forces from nineteen nations, including the United States, the 
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United Kingdom, Canada and Australia, that were contributing to OEF. For many 
nations, including the United Kingdom and Canada, this was the point at which 
they may have judged that the international anned conflict had come to an end. 
The Taliban government had been replaced by one drawn from the Northern Alli-
ance, which had itself fought alongside the coalition and was very much NATO's 
preferred replacement. That government had sought the assistance of the United 
Nations in establishing security in its country and provided fo rces from the Afghan 
National Army to fight alongside ISAF and against the remaining Taliban/al Qaeda, 
who wished to see it fail. 
The ISAF mission was much more narrowly drawn in both geographical and 
military terms. ISAF forces restricted their operations to Kabul and its envi-
rons: i3 they saw their role as the provision of support to the new government in 
Kabul in its continuing internal armed conflict with Taliban , al Qaeda and others 
who sought to overthrow it. The ISAF mission was generally based on self-defense 
activity (including the collective defense of Afghan government forces ), with only 
exceptional recourse to the use of offensive force under the law of armed conflict: 
in part this reflected fear of "mission creep." The characterization of the conflict as 
"non-international" also seemed to find favor with the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (lCRC), which, in June 2002, used the same description.14 Al-
though positions on the legal basis for operations varied among ISAF contributing 
nations, most relied on a combination of the Security Council Resolution and the 
consent of the government of Afghanistan. In fact, many contributing nations 
were pleased to distance themselves from the US notion of the Global War on Ter-
ror, understanding it (rightly or wrongly) to be the concept of an international 
armed conflict against international terrorist organizations wherever they might 
be in the world. They judged counterterrorism to be a law enforcement issue and 
characterized those they engaged under the laws of armed conflict within the con-
text of the non-international armed conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan (and they 
had to be members of identified groups that were considered party to those con-
flicts) as insurgents. 
In Afghanistan, the narrower mission of ISAF in supporting the fl edgling gov-
ernment in Kabul, with its wide international support and Security Council resolu-
tion basis, was altogether more palatable for some of the European nations that had 
rarely engaged in expeditionary operations since 1945. It was also a crudal mission 
if that government was to survive. For some NATO nations, uncertainty remained 
as to whether the remaining operations in Afghanistan amounted to an armed con-
flict and, if so, whether it justified the scale of operations undertaken by OEF. 
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Beyond Security Council Resolution 1510: Caution and Caveat 
In late 2003, Securi ty Council Resolution 1510 vested command of ISAF in NATO 
and extended its remit beyond Kabul. "Stage I Expansion," as it became known, be-
gan in the north and followed a request from the Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs 
for assistance with securi ty in the wider country. Notwithstanding that NATO had 
celebrated its fiftieth birthday some years before, the coalition was now engaged in 
the most complex operations in its history. As it became dear there was still sub-
stantial fighting to be done if the conditions for political and physical reconstruction 
were to be created, member States found themselves having to determine how far 
they were prepared to commit their militaries in a nation well outside the North At-
lantic area and on a type of operation that had not been contemplated in 1949. The 
result was the steady emergence of policy, legal and capability constraints that have 
characterized ISAF operations (although not always hindered them) to this day. 
Targeting 
One of the first areas in which differing nationaJ appetites became obvious was in 
the targeting process. Although nations were very dear as to their duty to come to 
the collective self-defense of coalition troops who found themselves in contact with 
the enemy, their positions regarding preplanned targeting under the law of armed 
conflict were less consistent. ISAP remained a wholly self-defense mission until 
2005, but OEF operated a formal target clearance process, designed to ensure that 
where force was contemplated against the enemy ("target sets" to use the military 
jargon) it was going to be used in accordance with the principles set out in the law 
of armed conflict. 
The first issue that arose was identifying the enemy. Soldiers who target a person 
who does not present an imminent threat to their lives1s have to be satisfied that 
they are attempting to kill a person who falls within the defini tion of a combatant. 
In the context of a war between States, and in the early days of the Afghan cam-
paign, this was a reasonably straightforward matter. The Taliban, al Qaeda and 
Afghan military were the combatants and tended to fight in conventionaJ ways. But 
by 2003, it had become more complex. As well as the fighting elements of al Qaeda 
and the Taliban, there were other tribal groups that wished to see the government 
in Kabul fail. There were also groups that were apathetic toward the government 
but opposed to the presence of foreign troops. Finally there were others who ap-
peared to enjoy the support of neighboring States or who had traveled to Afghani-
stan to fight. Different nations took different views of whom they were engaged 
with in an armed conflict, so coalition targeting arrangements had to ensure that 
the nation that owned the assets likely to be allocated to the particular target was 
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satisfied that the individuals they were likely to kill were within its own national un-
derstanding of who was a combatant. It is fair to say that the United States took a 
wider view of whom might legitimately be targeted than some of its European allies. 
The US approach reflected the widespread poli tica1 and public support at home, 
while the European position reflected their more cautious national positions. 
The application of Additional Protocol I to the conflict (and particularly its con-
tinued application once the conflict arguably ceased to be an international armed 
conflict in June 2002) is an issue that has exercised academic minds but had little 
impact on the conduct of operations. Those States that are signatories to Protocol I 
applied it throughout their targeting operations (because it applied as a strict mat-
ter oflaw or because it is their policy to apply it) and those who are not applied their 
own understandings on the customary international law framework relating to the 
use offorce in offensive operations. The application of a uniform targeting practice 
throughout the period from invasion to the current day is for two reasons. First. as 
a matter of national policy, many nations will say that the principles set out for use 
in an international armed conflict. be they in Additional Protocol I or a body of 
similar customary international law. ought to be applied in any offensive opera-
tions. It is difficult to make an argument that those who find themselves at risk of 
collateral damage. for example, in a non-international armed conflict are entitled 
to less consideration that those in the vicinity of an international armed conflict. 
The second reason is a purely practical one. Targeting processes have to be care-
fully constructed to meet international law requirements and to allow lawful tar-
gets to be engaged as quickly and effectively as possible. Once a process has been 
put in place. it has to be rehearsed and personnel trained in their roles. To import a 
separate set of standards for a commander to apply (albeit advised by a military 
lawyer) is simply to overcomplicate the process. The better approach is to settle on 
the highest standards that can be said to be applicable (those for an international 
armed conflict) and use them for all kinetic targeting operations. Quite apart from 
the practical benefits of the latter approach. it made determination of the point at 
which the conflict changed from international to non-international irrelevant to 
the tactical commander. 
Furthermore, the application of the principle of proportionality varied among 
States. NATO developed its own position on what was an acceptable level of collat-
eral damage for the air campaign in Afghanistan but some nations took a more re-
strictive view than NATO. Not only did that mean that assets of those nations 
would not conduct the mission, but officers of those nations embedded in the tar-
geting process might be barred from contributing to its success. Although NATO is 
a legal entity for contractual and other purposes and was created by treaty. it can-
not set out a single position on public international law matters which are reserved 
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solely for States. NATO is not, nor can it be, a signatory to the Geneva Conven-
tions, the Ottawa Treaty or other law of armed conflict treaties, but its member na-
tions have individual treaty obligations which are reflected in the organization's 
planning and procedures. 
The position was further complicated by the multinational staffs at ISAF head-
quarters (HQ) and regional HQs. Although brigade-level fo rmations tended to be 
wholly or largely from a single nation, thereby making it obvious which national 
provisions would apply, HQ staffs were invariably mixed. At ISAF HQ, with offi-
cers of more than ten nations regularly involved in an operation, determining 
whose caveats applied was not straightforward. In fact, for the military lawyer, is-
sues of State responsibility for the actions of others are some of the most complex 
that they encounter in coalition operations. The long-standing principle that a sol-
dier will not assist a colleague from another nation to carry out an action he knows 
he is forbidden from doing himself is now reflected at the State level in the Interna-
tional Law Commission's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Interna-
tionally Wrongful Acts, notably at Articles 16 and 17.16 But even the publication of 
these Articles, which are not binding, did little to settle an approach to the issue. 
Officers of some States when asked to authorize a mission which their national pol-
icy or legal positions prevented their authorizing would take the view that they 
were required to prevent the mission from taking place, because in the view of their 
governments it was unlawful. Officers of other States, faced with the same issue, 
would choose to step aside and hand their roles to officers whose nations allowed 
them to assist. Although this approach reduced the nwnber of operations that were 
thwarted, it required the reorganization of command structures depending on the 
nature of the mission and the nationality of the post holder. The operational lawyer 
and targeteer needed to understand not only which nations were barred from as-
sisting, but also whether their officers would thwart the mission or merely abstain. 
A related issue is the commander's responsibility for the manner in which those 
who are of another nationality, but under his command, carry out their mission. 
Putting aside the issue of command responsibility for war crimes, which has been 
well addressed elsewhere, there remains the issue of the extent to which a com-
mander is obliged to scrutinize the means by which troops under his command 
conduct their mission to ensure they comply with his own national legal position. 
A useful illustration is the use of anti-personnel mines (APM) in respect to which 
many nations are signatories to the Ottawa Convention,l1 although the use of this 
example should not be seen as an indication that any nation employed APM in Af-
ghanistan. Is a commander whose nation has ratified the Ottawa Convention 
(noting particularly the requirement "[n]ever under any circumstances ... [t]o as-
sist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited 
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to a State Party under this Convention") 18 obliged to ensure that those under his 
command do not employ them even if their own nations have not ratified the 
Convention? 
A parallel example from the maritime environment is the exercise of the right of 
visi t. Some nations take the view that the right to visit in the absence of one of the 
legal bases set out in Article 110 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Seal9 re-
quires the specific permission of the flag State in each instance. Others consider 
that consent to board can be given by the ship's master. If a naval commander from 
a nation that requires specific flag State permission wants to have a vessel boarded 
but is unable to obtain the consent of the flag State, he could direct a vessel of a na-
tion that permits boardings on the basis of a master's consent to conduct the 
boarding on that basis. Alternatively, on what might be called the restrictive view, 
he might seek assurances from all vessels under his command that they will adopt 
the flag State consent approach for the duration of the time they are under his com-
mand. Each nation will reconcile these matters in a different way, but one ap-
proach that was seen in the ISAF structure was for the commander simply to ensure 
that any mission or direction he gives is capable of being carried out within his own 
nation's legal commitments and interpretations. Hence, an order by a commander 
from an Ottawa Convention signatory nation to troops from a non-signatory na-
tion to lay APM would not pass the test, while an order to a ship to conduct en-
forcement and search operations in a particular sea area might do so: it does not 
presuppose an activity which the commander is not allowed to carry out himself. 
Deten tion 
The second area in which significant divergence in approach became evident was 
in respect to detention. Prior to June 2002 (the period in which all coalition nations 
agreed that the conflict was international in nature), those who were detained 
might have expected their custody to be governed by the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions. Combatants other than members of the armed forces of Afghanistan may 
have been entitled to prisoner of war status under Geneva Convention Il l, and the 
expectation was that this issue would be resolved by way of Article 5 tribunals. The 
ICRC persists to this day in the view that the Taliban were not de facto prisoners of 
war but ought to have had their status properly determined. Those who were deter-
mined not to have been entitled to prisoner of war status ought to have been prose-
cuted. In practice, significant numbers of those captured on the battlefield by US 
forces were adjudged to be unlawful combatants and held at US facilities in Af-
ghanistan or elsewhere. 
From June 2002, although the United States continued with the use of the "un-
lawful combatant» categorization, the other coalition members moved swiftly to a 
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model which they considered better fit the recategorization of the conflict asa non-
international armed conflict. Many ISAF nations were extremely uneasy about be-
coming involved in any kind of detention operation, and to this day will not arrest 
or detain Afghan nationals. Others accepted that the campaign would require 
some detention element ifit was to succeed and settled on short-term detention on 
behalf of the Afghan government as the preferred concept. In practice, this in-
volved detention for short periods (days rather than weeks) to facilitate transfer to 
the Afghan National Police or other law enforcement agency. The legal basis for de-
tention was, like the basis for presence itself, considered to be the relevant Security 
Council resolutions and the consent of the government of Afghanistan. Although 
there has never been an explicit authority to detain in the resolutions, the term ''all 
necessary means," notably in Resolution 15102(1 and subsequent resolutions, was 
considered to give the requisite authority for detention for the purposes of self-
defense and mission accomplishment. The Afghan government supported ISAF 
detention operations, both in political and practical terms, by cooperating with ar-
resting units and providing Afghan National Police to ISAF missions that included 
a detention element. Despite these two firm legal bases for detention, many ISAF 
nations were reluctant to take part in detention operations. 
In terms of the legal framework that was judged to govern the detention ar-
rangements, Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, certain aspects 
of customary international law and applicable human rights law were most often 
cited. For most European nations that meant giving consideration to the applica-
tion of the European Convention on Human Rights, 21 a regional h uman rights 
treaty widely ratified by European States. 
The extent of application of the European Convention on Human Rights to de-
ployed operations was (and remains) not entirely dear, but what was clear from the 
start was that some nations considered that it had a bearing on detention opera-
tions. So far as can be detennined, no signatory State took the view that human 
rights law was suspended during an armed conflict. They took the position that hu-
man rights law, while only capable of binding the State (it does not for example 
bind al Qaeda), certainly continues to apply to some extent during armed conflict, 
a position subsequently approved by the International Court of Justice.22 In fact, 
the Convention concerns appear to have been a facto r in dissuading some States 
from taking any part in ISAF detention operations. The better view,13 it is submit-
ted, is that the ''all necessary means" provision in the Afghan resolutions24 gives an 
implied authority to conduct detention operations for the purposes of accomplish-
ing the mission. That implied authority does not set aside obligations under appli-
cable human rights law but it does give a basis for detention that is not defeated by 
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human rights treaties. What the Afghan resolutions certainly did not give was a 
power of internment such as those in respect to Iraq had given.25 
In any event, if detention remains for as short a period as necessary in order to 
effect a transfer to the Afghan authorities, those nations who take part in ISAF 
detentions may hope that by limiting their operations in such a way they are miti-
gating the risk of challenge under human rights law. 
Conclusion 
Given the extraordinary speed with which an ad hoc coalition was formed to in-
vade Afghanistan in October 200 I and the wide range of nations that contributed 
to the mission, conflicts in legal positions appear to have been few. Perhaps it is to 
be expected that an attack such as that on September 11,200 1 will cause govern-
ments to set aside concerns about the strict interpretation of the UN or NATO 
Charters. Certainly the militaries of coalition nations, which concern themselves 
chiefly with in bello rather than ad bellum issues, were left in no doubt that they 
were taking part in an international armed conflict against Afghanistan. Once it 
became dear that ISAF, on the one hand, and OEF, on the other, had different vi-
sions for the nature of operations subsequent to the installation of the Northern 
Alliance in June 2002 as the governing body of Afghanistan, international law posi-
tions on a number of issues began to diverge. There were concerns then, and there 
remain concerns now, that operating two separate missions at two different tem-
pos in the same country in an attempt to suppress the same enemy is a recipe for a 
conflict of laws, but the nations that contribute to both missions have generally 
learned to reconcile the legal differences to ensure they do not prejudice success. 
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